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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THE CHALLENGE FOR THE MODERN DAY OPERATIONAL LEADER:
SUCCEEDING IN THE REALM OF CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

by

Douglas R. Schueler

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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23 October 2009

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Abstract

The Challenge for the Modern Day Operational Leader: Succeeding in the Realm of Civilian Organizations. Interactions with a multitude of civilian government and non-government organizations are certain to be part of future military operations. The major challenge for the military leader at the operational level of war will not necessarily be in how he leads the military organization under his charge but in the requirement to cooperate and coordinate with other governmental agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and selected elements of the private sector. This paper will focus on the leadership characteristics and traits that are critical to the senior military leader when dealing with the aforementioned organizations and entities. Case studies followed by a comparison and contrast of leadership styles will be used to analyze and critique the most productive characteristics and traits. The conclusion will reveal the most successful leadership styles, while recommendations will propose actions intended to ensure future military leaders are groomed and selected based on their potential for success.

Introduction

The art of military leadership is well studied and documented. Throughout the evolution of warfare, it could be said that while the tactics and weapons used to fight wars have changed, the basic leadership principles have withstood the test of time. This statement, however, may be primarily limited to leadership of warfighters on the field of battle. A major development since the end of the Cold War in 1989 has been the expansion of the environment in which the military leader, in particular at the operational level of war, finds himself operating. Quoting from the former commander of U.S. Central Command, retired Marine Gen Tony Zinni, –Today, we must engage in reconstructing societies even as we are still engaged in fighting—not after. And even when fighting has officially ceased, we continue to work to ensure stability and security so that complex economic, developmental, and diplomatic efforts can proceed. Today, we need integrated approaches to conflicts and security requirements; and *all leaders*—military, political, business, diplomatic—are crying for a more balanced application of the elements of power.”¹ If this is not an expansion of the military leader’s area of influence, it is definitely an expansion of his area of interest. The major change being referred to above is not how a military leader deals with the servicemen under his charge, but the difference is the requirement to communicate and coordinate with other governmental agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and selected elements of the private sector. This paper will focus on the leadership characteristics and traits that are critical to the senior military leader at the operational level of war when dealing with the aforementioned organizations and entities. Given that the relative success of modern day operations is more dependent than ever on the ability to operate in conjunction with government and civilian

organizations, this paper proposes that there are key traits and characteristics of senior leaders that should be used for selection of future commanders at the operational level of war.

Drawing on another example from General Zinni describing the changing environment, a comparison of escalation in the number of United Nations peacekeeping or observer missions aimed at defusing crises and building stability will be used. From its beginnings in 1945 through 1978, the UN conducted only 13 such operations, and in the following ten years no more were added. Since then, however, the count has risen significantly, with 47 operations being launched between 1988 and the publishing of Zinni's *The Battle for Peace* in 2006.² Another aspect of these post-Cold War operations is that they often involve fragmented political authority, creating internal conflicts with more than two sides, and frequently changing combinations of allegiances.³ Fortuitously, the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, which reorganized and integrated the military for joint operations, helped shape and focus U.S. military forces for these new challenges. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, dictates that joint force commanders (JFC) employ the resources of other governmental agencies in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve greater combat power and operational effectiveness through synergistic action.⁴ A publication by the United States Institute of Peace also clearly recognizes that there are critical leadership responsibilities of all involved actors that have a cross-cutting impact on mission success, namely to "build unity of purpose among the military, NGOs, IGOs, government authorities, and private sector."⁵ This paper will use selected case studies to illustrate how the United States and the international community will likely conduct peace, stability, and relief operations in the future. The scenarios and

respective case studies follow: heavy U.S. military engagement – Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti; international peacekeeping force – United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR); and major natural disaster relief – Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.⁶ The focus of each of these case studies is on the performance of the senior operational leaders, specifically Joint Task force Commanders, and their interaction with civilian counterparts. One observation drawn from studies of these leadership examples is that while some actions could not be directly linked to the individual senior leader, the credit or blame in each case's failure or success falls back on the senior leader based on the guidance and climate he set for his staff.

Case Study: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was initiated in 1994 in response to the deterioration of stability within the government of Haiti. The declining situation began when the democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by officers of the Haitian army in 1991. Following a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing an embargo on Haiti, a subsequent agreement was reached between the Aristide government and the military on a process and time frame for transition back to the democratic government. When this transition did not proceed as planned, the earlier imposed international embargo was expanded and a more aggressive effort to restore Aristide was initiated, which included plans for U.S. military intervention.⁷ During the preparation for this operation, two separate operational plans (OPLANS) were developed: one with a heavy military emphasis that included a forcible entry and a second involving a permissive entry with a primary focus on stabilization, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Initiation

of the second OPLAN benefited from more robust interagency involvement by allowing for wider participation due to its lower classification level.⁸ Following the order to execute the operation, and with portions of the invasion force already airborne and enroute to Haiti, eleventh-hour negotiations by former President Jimmy Carter, accompanied by Senator Sam Nunn and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin Powell, led to the resignation and departure from Haiti of the top military leaders.⁹ This event shifted planning away from the heavy military option and set the stage for permissive entry of a U.S. stabilization force on 19 September 1994.¹⁰

During the planning phase for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, interagency dialogue at the strategic level was adequate despite the lack of clear political guidance. At the operational level, however, there was little coordination between military and civilian agencies.¹¹ Inadequate coordination during the planning phase was likely due to a preoccupation with military plans for a forced entry. Once the operation was in the execution phase with troops on the ground, however, there was even less time available for the commander and his staff to conduct external coordination. The priority of interagency planning by the senior leadership should have been stressed at a higher level during the critical planning phase. With forces on the ground in Haiti, initial problems ranged from lagging logistical support to delays in civilian organizations (both government and NGOs) being ready to begin nation building programs.¹² Each of these areas highlighted a mutual ignorance of counterpart culture and capabilities between the military and civilian organizations—once again an opportunity where senior leadership emphasis could have narrowed the gap in planning and coordination. Lessons learned highlight that while the overall coordination with OGAs during planning for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY fell short by modern standards, at the time

this operation took place it marked the ~~first~~ time in recent memory that the U.S. government had undertaken to develop a formal interagency political-military plan in advance.”¹³

Without a clearly defined chain of command between military and civilian agencies, the question of “who is in charge” became an immediate concern. While UPHOLD DEMOCRACY took place without the benefit of the more refined civil-military organizational relationships in place today, the combatant commander or his JFC should have intervened to ensure a path to success through unity of effort defined by clear lines of authority and coordination. The perception by after-action workshop participants was that there needed to be an operational level leader to coordinate and direct all agencies and forces involved, but there were mixed opinions of whether this should be the JFC or the Ambassador.¹⁴ On a positive note, General Shelton was credited with taking the initiative to seek out and integrate activities with Ambassador Swing in Haiti, an action that proved key to the success of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.¹⁵ Despite good cooperation, a weakness in understanding major issues was felt by the respective staffs because the senior leadership coordination was not conducted in a common “operations center” environment. Command and control, as well as arrangements for coordination and cooperation, should be carefully considered and established before an operation, rather than relying on ad-hoc solutions during the execution phase.¹⁶

Despite civil-military coordination shortcomings during the planning and initial execution phase of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the overall effort during this operation should be viewed as a success and a positive step towards the advancement of coordinated civil-military operations. One of the highlights was the effective employment of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) concept, leveraging lessons learned during earlier relief efforts in

Somalia in 1992. This was a partial carryover from the members of the 10th Mountain Division which had also served in Somalia. The CMOC in Haiti became active within the first few days of the operation, matching support requirements with organization capabilities throughout the capital region and expanding to a second CMOC in the northern part of the country shortly thereafter.¹⁷

Actions by both Generals Shelton and Meade set the stage early in the operation to ensure the military did not push aside civilian members of government agencies and NGOs who were recognized as critical to not only re-stabilizing the government but delivering compassionate care to the Haitian people.¹⁸ Examples of programs initiated under their leadership, which significantly helped provide a secure environment for the transition to true humanitarian activities, included: Ministerial Advisory Teams to improve government functions; the weapons –buy back” program, which decreased the need to conduct weapons searches of individual houses; and an –adopt-a-school” program, which allowed soldiers to volunteer their time directly to help the children of Haiti.¹⁹ One clear example of MG Meade’s commitment to being supportive of NGOs was indicated in his mission statement— –conduct a seamless transition to CJTF-190 for decisive Civil Military Operations. . . continue the expansion of CMO and Foreign Internal Defense.”²⁰ An insightful observation by Meade’s successor, MG Fisher, was –that military forces must train for their most taxing mission, warfighting, but routine training also should include operations other than war and humanitarian objectives. . . personalities and talents are important to the success of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.”²¹ The political advisor to the JFC credited the –superb relationships” among military and civilian officials as one of the clear

keys to success during the operation, with the senior leadership taking the lead to create an atmosphere of collegial cooperation—a critical step for such a major operation.²²

Case Study: UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established in the fall of 1993 to oversee what many hoped would be an end to a four-year civil war. The August 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement between the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) paved the way for a UN peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN charter.²³ During the following months, the UNAMIR peacekeeping force grew to approximately 2,500, consisting primarily of troops from Belgium, Ghana and Bangladesh, and was led by Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire.²⁴ Ethnic division between the Tutsi and hard-line Hutu ethnic groups continued to plague the peace process. Following the shooting down of a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on April 6, 1994, Hutu extremists began a killing spree against Tutsi and moderate Hutu citizens who had supported the peace agreement. Within three months, between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were dead; 500,000 Rwandans were internally displaced within the country; and over two million Rwandans fled to neighboring countries.²⁵ Starting out as a classic peacekeeping mission to monitor an agreed upon ceasefire, the situation in Rwanda evolved into one of the worst cases of genocide in modern times. As a watershed event in the post-Cold War era of increased United Nations and international involvement, the Rwandan tragedy displayed how the slow policy development and approval process within the United Nations was unsuited for the volatile mission into which the situation in Rwanda escalated.

As a result of the devastating outbreak of ethnic violence in Rwanda, it could be assessed that the peacekeeping mission was set up for failure from its beginning because of the minimal resources allocated and the lack of a clear mandate for enforcing the peace. Major General Dallaire's hands were tied from the start; however, any commander in the field must ultimately assume responsibility for the mission which he undertakes. After his initial assignment to the mission, Dallaire was able to spend two weeks on the ground in Rwanda and produced a report on what he felt his requirement would be to conduct the mission. The report was submitted to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In Dallaire's words, "They pretty well agreed to what I had planned, but they reduced a lot of the stuff I felt we had to do in support of the mission. . . a lot of the emphasis of people looking at the report was on getting that thing to be a lowest cost possible and get out of there as fast as you can."²⁶ In addition to reduced force levels and the lack of a clear mandate for intervention in the enforcement of peace, the mission would be sent forward without the capability to conduct thorough intelligence analysis.²⁷ Under these conditions, the commander assigned would be justified to stand his ground and not take forces forward if he did not believe they were properly resourced to achieve success; however, even Dallaire would later question whether he compromised too much and took too great of a risk because he personally wanted the mission so badly.²⁸

Relationships with counterparts in any organization become important leverage points with which to accomplish the mission. Within the United Nations Headquarters, Dallaire was able to take advantage of a prior Canadian acquaintance with Major General Maurice Baril, head of the military component of the DPKO. He was also able to establish a solid relationship with Kofi Annan, who served in the DPKO as the Under-Secretary-General of

Peacekeeping.²⁹ One of the relationships that was more strained for Dallaire, however, was the one that potentially had the most crucial impact on the mission—that with the UN Special Representative for Rwanda, Jacques Roger Booh-Booh. Failure to cultivate this particular relationship caused friction that imperiled the mission as time progressed.³⁰ Relationships with NGOs, with exception of the Red Cross, were also never fully developed by Dallaire.³¹ One of the more productive relationships that Dallaire did successfully cultivate was with the media. By allowing unfettered access to his headquarters operations center and transparency amongst his staff, Dallaire ensured the media became a source of information that was mutually shared and beneficial to the mission.³² One of the actions that drew attention and highlighted Dallaire's strained relationship with UN Envoy Booh-Booh, was a secure FAX he sent back to UN Headquarters in January of 1994. An informant had relayed a warning that Hutu extremists were planning to provoke a renewed civil war and begin slaughtering Tutsis. The informant also reported an arms cache which Dallaire specifically requested permission to seize in the next 36 hours. Dallaire sent this FAX in the middle of the night, without first consulting Mr. Booh-Booh.³³ To Dallaire's dismay, the United Nations refused to authorize the request for seizing the cache. Less effective raids on weapons caches were eventually permitted by the United Nations, but it will never be known whether better consultation with Mr. Booh-Booh or more effective communication with the UN Headquarters would have provided the necessary mandate for action by Dallaire's UNAMIR forces.

Following the plane crash with the Rwandan president on board, two subsequent actions by Dallaire would receive scrutiny in the aftermath of the crisis. The first was his direction to send ten Belgian peacekeepers to protect the Rwandan Prime Minister, who he

considered to be a vulnerable target as a moderate Hutu. Extremist Hutus went on to torture and kill the Prime Minister as well as the ten Belgian troops, igniting criticism from the Belgium government that Dallaire had ordered the Belgians' on a mission without proper support. Belgium subsequently decided to withdraw its UNAMIR force contribution, perhaps the best trained of all UNAMIR forces, in the ensuing days.³⁴ Dallaire's second questionable act was his request for a reinforcement of 5,000 troops four days after the plane crash and the eruption in violence. Dallaire felt that the additional troops would prevent the violence from spreading. The United Nations finally authorized this plus up of forces on 17 May, more than a month after the major hostilities began. The implementation was even slower with troops arriving after the genocide was over, a missed opportunity Dallaire still bemoans.³⁵ Leaders in similar positions to Dallaire will always be questioned with respect to their decisions either to follow the mandates from higher authorities blindly or to choose alternative courses of action that they know will protect the lives of their troops or the local populace. At a low point in the operation and in response to an order by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to pull out completely, Dallaire responded, "No way, I refuse to abandon the mission and turn tail and run while the bodies were piling up all over the god damn place."³⁶

Case Study: Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake of just over 9.0 on the Richter Scale struck off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia in the Indian Ocean resulting in a tsunami that devastated the shores of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, Malaysia and other countries as far west as the eastern shores of Africa. The estimated death toll surpassed 289,000

people with another 1.1 million displaced; thousands of miles of homes and infrastructure were also destroyed. Within two days of this incredible disaster, U.S. Pacific Command stood up a Joint Task Force led by the Commanding General of III Marine Expeditionary Force, Lieutenant General Robert Blackman, Jr. Its mission was to provide assistance to the affected governments of the area and to conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in support of the U.S. government lead agency and in coordination with international organizations, NGOs and partner nations. Due to political sensitivities, the JTF was later renamed a Combined Support Force (CSF 536), with three regionally established Combined Support Groups (CSGs). By the end of this operation, more than 12,600 U.S. military personnel had participated in the international relief effort that included 33 foreign governments, multiple U.S. government agencies and IGOs, and over 150 NGOs.³⁷ Purely a natural disaster relief effort, this operation fit squarely into the lower end of the range of military operations. Unfortunately, sometimes these operations tend to be viewed as a “lower-tier” effort for military planners. This operation, however, provided insights into just how complicated and intricate the details of an undertaking of this nature could become.

Due to the far reaching effects and the variety of actors that may become involved, HA/DR responses will never follow a precise pattern that can be codified in doctrine. Senior leadership must provide clear and effective guidance during planning initiation in order to move the operation towards an effective start. The very nature of such disasters is so varied that the military is unlikely to have an established contingency plan in place, and host nations vary greatly in their individual preparedness and capacities to tie in outside support.³⁸ Moreover, host nation acceptance of outside support from the U.S. military may be mixed. Such was the case during Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Host nation responses ranged

from the “open armed” welcome in Thailand, with whom the U.S. enjoyed a close, long standing relationship, to the cautious acceptance by Indonesia.³⁹ A similar reluctance for cooperation is often displayed by some NGOs who want to keep their distance from the U.S. military in order to maintain a perception of neutrality.⁴⁰ A final challenge for the military, especially at the senior leadership level, is in accepting the role as a supporting element to the lead civilian agency. The military is often best poised for rapid response and brings along an established command and control structure, highly capable communications gear, major equipment (ships, aircraft, material handling equipment, etc.), and, most importantly, motivated personnel. In addition to guiding the military contribution to a HA/DR operation, senior military leadership will find themselves in the revolving role as diplomat and coordinator with various OGA and NGO actors who may arrive with divergent interests.

The military effort in support of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE provided an excellent example of what the U.S. military could contribute to such an operation. While areas for improvement were certainly noted, the overall success of the operation was duly recognized for its positive outcomes.⁴¹ Communications, both from the perspective of the external strategic message sent to the public as well as internally amongst military and civilian organizations involved, were deemed as a high priority by Blackman.⁴² With regard to strategic communications, Blackman targeted his message to both the population of the affected nations as well as the United States to be clear in the role that the U.S. military was involved. His message conveyed that the U.S. military was only there in support of the affected host nations and that the host nations, in conjunction with other government and international agencies, were in charge. His message continued that the U.S. military would only stay until the host nations, OGAs and NGOs had sufficient capacities on their own to

address the needs of the people.⁴³ Clearly recognizing that the center of gravity for the operation was the capacities of the OGAs, NGOs and host nations, Blackman made the decision to ensure all communications remained unclassified. This avoided disruption of effective cooperation with these agencies. While this caused compatibility difficulties for some military units, as well as exposing the operational security risk of major ship and aircraft movements, Blackman accepted this risk in favor of supporting the larger effort.⁴⁴ The redeployment of military forces and full transition of all efforts to the civilian agencies was also seen as a critical element of mission success. Blackman specifically steered his staff away from planning specific requirements as the triggers for transition. Instead, he referred to the transition as “Jell-O” and decided that a declining number of requests for assistance would be the best indication of a reduced need for military assistance. His guidance was that —military staffs must avoid building exhaustive task lists for humanitarian relief that will lead their organizations down the dark road to mission creep and quagmire.”⁴⁵ Lasting effects beyond the lives saved and assistance provided in the areas affected by the tsunami include increased viability of American presence and influence in the region as well as unprecedented cooperation with various regional nations—Indonesia in particular.⁴⁶ While any such effort is certainly a result of the efforts of the many personnel involved, the leadership provided from the top during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE had tremendous impacts on the final outcome.

Comparison and Contrast of Leadership Styles

The three case studies presented cover a broad range of military operations. More importantly, these cases demonstrate that operational military leaders must deal with a wide

variety of civilian organizations. While measures of success are situationally dependent, common trends exist in the leadership styles that contributed in either a positive or negative way towards overall mission success. All of the leaders displayed a firm grasp of the scope of the mission; however, each had varying degrees of successful interaction with his various civilian counterparts. During Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, General Blackman displayed a firm understanding of the military's supporting role, which was primarily to enable the civilian agencies to succeed in their relief efforts. He benefited from the experiences of U.S. military commanders in previous HA/DR operations, which enabled him to apply a wider variety of lessons learned as well as to develop a more mature civil-military organizational structure. For the leaders of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, lessons learned were applied from prior experiences in Somalia; however, there was also a clear understanding of the coordination requirements with OGAs, especially on the part of General Shelton. Conversely, UNAMIR presented several major challenges for General Dallaire. At the time there were very few case studies available to Dallaire to draw appropriate lessons for the situation he was facing in Rwanda. While many of the failures in Rwanda were directly attributable to a lack of available resources for the mission, how Dallaire handled these shortfalls as well as his occasional fractious interaction with key UN officials raised questions regarding how he could have managed the crisis more effectively.

A recurring theme across all of the case studies was the strength of the personal relationships built between the military leaders and their civilian counterparts. General Shelton developed a superb relationship with Ambassador Swing in Haiti, no doubt as a result of wisdoms learned from the cooperative model forged by Ambassador Oakley and LtGen Johnston in Somalia. Both Oakley and Johnston's common commitment to

collaboration was widely identified as a major contribution to the success of the united task force phase of the Somalia operations.⁴⁷ In sharp contrast to this productive relationship in Haiti was the one between General Dallaire and UN Special Representative Booh-Booh in Rwanda. Their strained personal relationship resulted in a series of avoidable miscues. During UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, General Blackman worked with the ambassadors of the three primary host nations every day.⁴⁸ Well-planned strategic communications was another area where deliberate, focused efforts produced significant dividends. Blackman carefully employed well-planned and coordinated strategic communications to enhance mission accomplishment by highlighting the success that was being achieved. Flexibility and adaptability in staff organization and supportive interaction with OGAs, NGOs and host nations proved to be the hallmark of successful leadership.

While the spirit of cooperation and coordination certainly have proven successful during past operations, an alternative approach and counter-argument worthy of consideration stresses unity of military command to minimize the challenge associated with the time critical nature of certain crises. Effective coordination, especially when all decision makers cannot be co-located, is very time consuming and labor-intensive in terms of negotiating a consensus prior to action. With lives imperiled and the momentum of a disaster threatening to tip the balance toward catastrophe, would it not be better for a JFC to unilaterally take charge in order to secure the safety of the populace and endangered property in the near term? Is it wrong for a military force to “go it alone” for the sake of saving lives and controlling tempo at the onset of an operation? Common principles of military leadership would argue in favor of such decisive action. Considerations to contend with, however, are the long-term effects. In almost every case, the military contribution is only

intended for the initial phases of an operation until either security is sufficiently in place or other agencies have built the capacity to take over. Impetuous, pre-emptive leadership from a military commander will inevitably alienate those with clear responsibilities and capabilities for the stabilization and reconstruction phase, that is the involved OGAs, NGOs and host nation. While success for a given mission may dictate the insertion of swift and decisive action for certain situations, long-term stability will only be achieved through a cooperative atmosphere that includes all stakeholders.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Modern day leadership challenges in response to the complex crises that the U.S. military is more than ever being tasked to support go well beyond merely creating and integrating organizational structures. The best formulas for success also require a clear understanding and awareness of the objectives, philosophy and culture of the various OGAs, IGOs and NGOs that may become involved in an operation. Ultimate mission success and effective transition to full civilian control demand the cooperation of military leaders who understand the purpose, capabilities and potential contributions of each entity involved. The key leadership characteristics and traits required of senior leaders who will serve as a JFC in modern operations cannot be taken for granted. JFCs chosen for multi-agency situations should be selected for duty based on their ability to build relationships, provide clear strategic communications guidance, and foster a climate of cooperation and coordination among disparate agencies and staffs likely to be present in joint operating areas. Each of these traits requires leaders with a studied awareness of the capabilities, limitations and cultures of the various civilian organizations with whom they are most likely to interact.

Developing future JFCs for the challenges demanded by modern crisis response requires a focused effort. Presented below are two recommended actions to assist in this endeavor. The first is to create an education continuum that builds a knowledge base for future success in working with civilian organizations. This education should begin during field grade officer professional military education and continue through general/flag officer capstone orientation. Interagency familiarity and awareness should become second nature much like U.S. military capabilities and limitations. Second, respective service officer evaluation and rating systems, which are the basis for officer promotion and command selection, must recognize and reward those leaders whose accomplishments and skills have prepared them for greater responsibilities in the international, multi-agency arena.

Interaction with a multitude of civilian government and non-government organizations has become an inherent aspect of nearly all twenty-first century military operations. Unfortunately, this interaction is not something military leaders have always planned or trained for in the past. Future victories, however, will depend on embracing and succeeding in this interaction. Developing and selecting the best prepared joint force leaders will be an indispensable element of achieving and maintaining peace and stability in the future.

Notes

1. Zinni and Koltz, *Leading the Charge*, 118-119.
2. Zinni and Koltz, *The Battle for Peace*, 67.
3. Natsios, –Commander’s Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.” *Parameters*, 53.
4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5-0)*, IV-28. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, and Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, go further in stating that an integral responsibility of the commander is to maintain military to civil relations and emphasizes open and productive communications among OGAs, IGOs, NGOs and selected elements of the private sector. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, further emphasizes that integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations.
5. Perito, *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations*, xxxv.
6. Each of the case studies is also unique in the predominant civilian organization with which the JFC was required to interface with. During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY interface was primarily focused on U.S. OGAs; UNAMIR was a case of interaction with an IGA, namely the UN; and NGOs provided the primary interaction during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE.
7. Hayes and Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti-A Case Study*, 10-13.
8. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*, 65-73.
9. Hayes and Wheatley, 6-17.
10. Key leaders at the operational level during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY included then LTG Henry Shelton, Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps, designated as the JFC during the initial phases of this operation, and MGs David Meade and George Fisher, Commanding Generals of the 10th Mountain Division and 25th Infantry Division respectively. MG Meade would take over as JFC after Shelton, MG Fisher was to follow Meade.
11. Hayes and Wheatley, 34.
12. Ibid., 37-38.
13. Ibid., 49.
14. Ibid., 42-43.
15. Ballard, 202.
16. Hayes and Wheatley, 55.
17. Ballard, 153, 203.
18. Ibid., 206.
19. Ibid., 125, 148, 151.
20. Hayden, –Oral History Interviews: Operation Uphold Democracy JTF-190,” 2, 8.
21. Ivancovich and McGrady, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Conflict and Cultures*, 29, 36.
22. Hayden, 61.
23. Carlsson, Sung-Joo and Kupolati, –Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” 3.
24. Feil, *Preventing Genocide, How the Early Use of Force Might have Succeeded in Rwanda*, 5.

25. Ibid., 2
26. Barker, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” *Frontline*, 5.
27. Feil, 5.
28. Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil, The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 82.
29. Ibid., 44, 48.
30. Barker, 7.
31. Allen, “The General and the Genocide,” *Amnesty International NOW magazine*, 5.
32. Barker, 22.
33. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Interventions, Genocide in Rwanda*, 88.
34. Barker, 14-16.
35. Kuperman, 84.
36. Barker, 17.
37. U.S. Marine Corps, “Emerald Express 06-1 Military Support in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Assessment Report Insights and Observations,” 4.
38. United Nations Report, *Regional Workshop on Lessons Learned and Best Practices in the Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami*, 2.
39. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned*, 33.
40. Ibid., 116.
41. Ibid., 32-35.
42. Elleman, *Waves of Hope, The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, 69.
43. DefenseLink News Transcript. “DoD Briefing on Operation Unified Assistance, the Post-Tsunami Relief Effort,” 1-3.
44. Elleman, 71-72.
45. Daniel, “Operation Unified Assistance: Tsunami Transitions.” *Military Review*, 52-53.
46. Elleman, 103.
47. Casey and Oakley, “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 149.
48. U.S. Marine Corps, 7.

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